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Abstract  
For Bourdieu, the field of cultural production is comprised of an autonomous and a 
heteronomous sector.  A heteronomous sector is one that is interpenetrated by the commercial 
field. I discuss an arena that, until recently, was part of the relatively autonomous sector in 
the field of cultural production—the supported arts sector in the United Kingdom—and argue 
that it became more heteronomous, due to the penetration by the state.  Heteronomy due to 
the commercial field is present but secondary to, and driven by, the actions of the state. 
Political parties’ attempts to diffuse and legitimate a particular economic ideology have led to 
state demands that arts institutions adopt neoliberal business practices in exchange for 
funding.  Government giving to the arts, previously at arms-length, proved to be a Faustian 
bargain that demanded significant repayment in the form of lost autonomy.  Coercive 
pressures from the state, enacted over time, show how the domination of one field over 
another can occur, even when the domination is resisted. 
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Introduction 
In this paper, I make a theoretical argument about heteronomy in fields of action, 
drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s influential approach to cultural fields and to autonomy and 
heteronomy in them.  I argue that Bourdieu’s understanding of heteronomy in the field of 
cultural production as deriving from penetration by the commercial field needs to be 
expanded to include a consideration of penetration from the state.  I illustrate this argument 
with a discussion of government support for the arts in the United Kingdom, specifically in 
relationship to neoliberalism, a politico-cultural belief that advocates monetary exchange and 
free markets as the best method to organize human activity.  The supported arts sector 
includes institutions that house the visual or performing arts, such as art galleries,2 opera 
houses, non-profit theatres, symphony orchestras, ballet companies and the like that are, or 
potentially could be, funded by the public purse.  In recent decades, the British state has 
required arts institutions in its supported arts sector to take on certain characteristics 
consistent with neoliberalism.  
In the arts, especially the fine arts, a belief system revolving around art for art’s sake 
explicitly contrasts with the neoliberal model.  In the past (to oversimplify to some extent), 
non-profit arts institutions were more or less able to concentrate on artistic concerns. Today, 
they must explicitly attend to such business concerns as attendance figures and the financial 
costs of their activities. Attendance needs to increase.  Costs need to shrink, unless income 
can expand. Today’s arts institutions sell products to customers, where products include 
exhibitions and performances, but also goods and consumables sold in the shop and café. 
They compete in the leisure and tourism markets and contribute to the domestic economy, the 
balance of trade, and the growth of the creative sector. Most importantly, they use the tools of 
business management as means to achieve these goals. 
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The valuing of a protected sphere of art-for-art’s-sake is a relatively recent, western 
construction, tied to the defence of elite status boundaries (Bourdieu, 1984; 1993; 1996a; 
DiMaggio, 1982 a, b; 1987; Levine, 1988), which has been only partially achieved in that the 
fine arts are only relatively autonomous as compared to more commercial arts.  Nevertheless, 
the changes in the supported art sector that I discuss in this paper represent a fundamental 
shift in the operations of arts institutions, towards a heteronomous, managerial focus.  
Aspects of this shift, which is necessarily complex, have been described, as ‘privatization’ 
(Boorsma, et al., 1998; Wu, 2002), ‘commodification’ (Gray, 2000), ‘marketization’ 
(Alexander, 1999; 2008; Alexander et al., forthcoming; Mclean, 1997; Sandell and Janes, 
2007), ‘democratization’ (Ballé, 2002) and ‘instrumentalization’ (Gray, 2008; Toepler and 
Zimmer, 2002).3  While government ministers, ‘hard-nosed’ business people, and 
conservative economists might laud these changes, from within the arts world and from 
sympathetic academics these changes are a cause for concern or, at minimum, seen as a 
necessary evil (e.g. Appleyard, 1984; Hooper-Greenhill, 1988; Hewison, 1995; McCarthy et 
al, 2004; Mulcahy, 2004; Osborne, 1986; Zolberg, 2000).   
How does neoliberalism ‘get into’ fields where other institutional logics previously 
held sway?  The short answer—for the supported arts sector, at least—appears to be resource 
dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) or ‘coercive’ pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983), as governments’ changed requirements for the state funding on which cultural 
organizations were dependent.  To illustrate this, I will follow the changes in the state’s 
relationship to arts institutions over the last half-century.  I also suggest that state-driven 
pressure to place neoliberal tools into new fields serves to legitimate the neoliberal discourse.   
 
Neoliberalism 
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Neoliberalism is a political philosophy that identifies the competitive pursuit of self-
interest in a capitalist market freed from constraints as the foundation for individual freedom 
and the basis for organizing all aspects of human activity. It enshrines the value of free 
markets or ‘an explicit preference for private over public control’ (Centeno and Cohen, 2012: 
317). Also called ‘enterprise culture’ (Heelas and Morris, 1992), neoliberalism emphasizes 
three key principles: the efficiency of markets, the liberty of individuals, and the 
noninterventionism of the state.  It is a politico-cultural viewpoint, a power-producing 
philosophy that reproduces dominant privilege, as many scholars have argued (Bourdieu, 
1995; 1989a, b; 2003; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1999; 2001; Centeno and Cohen, 2012; 
Chang, 2010; Crouch, 2011; Evans and Sewell, 2013; Frank, 2000; McGuigan, 2005; 2009; 
2016).  Though ‘noninterventionist’, the state does have a role: to enact an institutional 
framework that supports neoliberal practices.  As Harvey (2005: 2) put it, ‘if markets do not 
exist…then they must be created, by state action if necessary.’ 
For the past thirty-five years or so, the UK government has worked to embed such 
market arrangements in many policy areas, including the cultural sector.  A crucial part of 
this is neatly packaged in the phrase ‘value for money’, which suggests that government 
funds must be spent efficiently, in economic terms. The supported arts sector, along with 
other public services, has become accountable for its use of ‘the taxpayers’ money’.  Value is 
demonstrated through measurable outputs (‘performance indicators’) that are assessed in 
monetary terms against inputs (i.e. funding levels). The number of museum visitors 
(‘customers’) or the social diversity of audiences for a performance (the ‘service provided’) 
are such indicators. Moreover, neoliberalism invariably employs the language of business, 
especially that of marketing. Managers of public services, therefore, are required to take up 
commercial approaches and practices. Revenue enhancement is another essential aspect of 
neoliberalism in the public sector. In the arts, this can be achieved through private 
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sponsorship or patronage and through earned income such as ticket sales or admission 
charges or revenue from sales in gift shops and cafés.  
Bourdieu wrote extensively about neoliberalism, as I will discuss below.  But I first 
set out the key issue addressed by the paper: Bourdieu’s ideas on autonomy and heteronomy 
in the field of cultural production.  I will then sketch out how changes in the British 
supported arts sector, enacted through funding, represent a reduction in its autonomy.  
 
Bourdieu and Fields 
Central to the argument here are Bourdieu’s ideas on fields.  Bourdieu (e.g. 1993, 
1996b) described society as consisting of a series of arenas, or ‘fields’ in which individuals 
vie for status and control, or in other words, where people struggle for the cultural, symbolic, 
social, and economic capital at stake in the field.  These arenas can be overlapping, but are 
often distinct, and different fields may be homologous (i.e., have similar structures).  
Overarching the various fields of action is the ‘field of power’: an arena in which elites 
compete for power and for hegemonic control over subordinate classes. 
An important part of Bourdieu’s work, notably in Distinction (1984), is his argument 
that elites not only compete with each other for control, but they also seek to legitimate their 
own position.  This allows elites to appear as ‘naturally’ superior.  For instance, taste in art 
(aesthetic judgment) may appear to be a neutral, personal choice, but in fact, Bourdieu 
argues, it is connected to a person’s position in the social order, and shaped by it (through 
habitus).  Moreover, taste for the ‘consecrated’ forms of art reproduces the inequality that 
enabled it in the first place.  In Bourdieu’s words:  
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At stake in every struggle over art there is also the imposition of an art of living, that 
is, the transmutation of an arbitrary way of living into the legitimate way of life which 
casts every other way of living into arbitrariness. (1984: 56-7) 
 
A preference for legitimated cultural forms is ‘an affirmation of the superiority’ of 
those who prefer them, which is why ‘art and cultural consumption are predisposed…to fulfil 
a social function of legitimating social differences’ (1984: 7). In other words, the dominant 
class positions its culture as ‘naturally’ the best.  It is not only in taste and cultural 
consumption that the dominant class seeks legitimation, however.  Elites also seek to 
legitimate their political and economic philosophies as well, neoliberalism being the case in 
point (e.g. Bourdieu, 1995: 10-11, 223-232; 1996b; 1998a).   
 
The Field of Cultural Production 
Bourdieu described the cultural field (or fields)4 as having autonomous and 
heteronomous poles (1993, 1996a).  In the former, as for example the literary world of 
Flaubert or in Symbolist poetry, the arts are rich with cultural capital, but relatively, or even 
literally, impoverished with respect to economic capital.  Producers vie with each other for 
varied symbolic capital such as prestige, with those showing the least interest in anything but 
the art itself gaining the most status.  Thus, cultural and symbolic capital are the stakes in the 
autonomous sphere.  
In the arts, Bourdieu referred to the autonomous pole of cultural production as the 
field of ‘restricted production’, which focuses on art for art’s sake.  The audience for such 
works is relatively small (‘restricted’) and producers produce mainly for other producers, not 
for broader or mass audiences. This autonomous sphere is supported by a ‘pure’ gaze, or 
more accurately, the claims viewers make that their gaze is pure.  Such an ‘aesthetic’ gaze is 
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constituted as ‘capable of considering the work of art in and for itself’ (1993: 36).  For 
Bourdieu, the autonomous sphere is found in the fine arts.   
Autonomous fields represent ‘the economic world reversed’ (see Bourdieu, 1993: 
Chapter 1).  Such fields are anti-economic because they shun (or profess to shun) economic 
profits and short-term gains.  This lack of interest in financial gains, the ‘disinterestedness’ of 
producers in anything but the art itself is a defining feature of autonomous fields. They are 
‘[f]ounded on the obligatory recognition of the values of disinterestedness and on the 
denigration of the “economy” (of the “commercial”)’ and they are ‘oriented to the 
accumulation of symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu 1996a: 142). Bourdieu (1993: 39) explained 
how this creates a reversal of the economic world: 
 
in the most perfectly autonomous sector of the field of cultural production, where the 
only audience aimed at is other producers (as with Symbolist poetry), the economy of 
practices is based, as in a generalized game of ‘loser wins’, on a systematic inversion 
of the fundamental principles of all ordinary economies: that of business (it excludes 
the pursuit of profit and does not guarantee any sort of correspondence between 
investments and monetary gains)…  
 
In contrast, Bourdieu defined heteronomous art fields as those that are interpenetrated 
by commercial fields.  They do not garner as much status as the ‘pure’, autonomous arts, but 
they have a greater ability to earn money. Bourdieu described this as the field of ‘large scale 
production’. Heteronomous arts range from the ‘Bourgeois arts’, which sell to and gain 
consecration from more privileged social classes, to lowbrow, commercial works, or 
‘Industrial arts’.  For Bourdieu, heteronomous fields in cultural production can encompass 
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the fine arts as well as the popular arts. This is because the autonomy or heteronomy has to 
do with the relationship among fields; it is not a property of genres of art. 
Bourdieu also recognized that an important component of the field is the apparatus 
that supports it.  With respect to the autonomous arts as a subfield of cultural production, 
Johnson (1993: 15) notes, 
 
The symbolic power of this sub-field’s products is sustained by a vast social 
apparatus encompassing museums, galleries, libraries, the educational system, literary 
and art histories, centres for the performing arts and so forth. 
 
Bourdieu (1993) saw art museums as instruments of the ‘pure gaze’ in that this gaze 
is ‘linked to the institution of the work of art as an object of contemplation, with the creation 
of…museums, and the parallel development of a corps of professionals appointed to conserve 
the work of art, both materially and symbolically’ (p. 36, emphasis in the original).  The 
museum is ‘consecrated and consecrating’ (p. 257), and contributes to a ‘discourse about a 
work [that] is not a mere accompaniment, intended to assist its perception and appreciation, 
but a stage in the production of the work, of its meaning and value’ (p. 110). Other 
institutions of fine arts are similarly consecrated and consecrating. 
My focus is on arts institutions, on the social apparatus, rather than on artistic 
producers themselves.  This apparatus, nevertheless, actually produces culture not just in 
producing meaning and value in the work of art, but also through the production of 
exhibitions and performances.  Attending an exhibition or a performance is the main way 
most people actually experience the fine arts. Bourdieu (1993:40) suggested that ‘The literary 
and artistic world is so ordered that those who enter it have an interest in disinterestedness’.  
Through this disinterest, arts organizations claim the cultural and symbolic capital that is 
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inherent in an autonomous field of art.  Arts institutions have thus historically produced an 
anti-economic, disinterested stance as a core aspect of their operations.  
 
Heteronomy and the State 
Bourdieu (1993: 37) argued that the field of cultural production is embedded within 
the field of power.  While the autonomous pole is relatively free from both political and 
economic penetration by the field of power, Bourdieu described heteronomy (in the field of 
large-scale production and also in the interpenetration that exists in the autonomous cultural 
sector) only in terms of commercial influence.  He tended to neglect the interpenetration of 
the political aspects of the field of power. I suggest that a very important change in the fine 
arts is that the relatively autonomous pole of the arts field has not only become more 
interpenetrated by the commercial field, the arts field has also become interpenetrated by the 
state. The nation-state is decreasing the autonomy of the field of cultural production, in 
concert with but separate from, the heteronomy that obtains due to the market. 
The potential for heteronomy from the sphere of politics is entirely consistent with 
Bourdieu’s model of the field of cultural production.  Indeed, in places he seemed to suggest 
that politics does penetrate the cultural field.  For instance, Bourdieu (1998a: 38) wrote, ‘It is 
in the realm of symbolic production that the grip of the state is felt most powerfully’.  But 
here Bourdieu was referring to academic and juridical writing, not the fine arts.  Moreover, 
Bourdieu did not develop this idea in The Field of Cultural Production (1993) or The Rules 
of Art (1996a), and heteronomous fields have been associated with commercial influence, 
rather than state influence.  
 
The Faustian Bargain 
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How is it, then, that the state has launched a direct assault on the elite aesthetics of the 
‘pure gaze’, and won the assent—or at least the acceptance—of neoliberal ideals by the 
professionals in charge of arts organizations that support high culture?  To answer this 
question, I will give an account of the ‘Faustian bargain’ made between arts institutions and 
the state. This is based on policy research and 20 years of observation of the UK supported 
art sector (sources on each era discussed are reported in footnotes). 
According to legend, Faust was a successful scholar but one ambitious for greater 
knowledge and worldly pleasures. In his bargain with the devil, he traded his soul for 
Mephistopheles’ assistance to attain his wishes. In the Faustian bargain between the arts and 
the British state, money from the state initially provided commissions, performances and 
exhibitions of great art.  State funding seemed beneficial, and safeguards were put in place to 
protect against certain dangers, such as party-political influence and the constrained or 
propagandizing state culture that can emerge from central ministries. However, state funding 
contained obligations, and these obligations, once benign—or, more accurately, previously 
consistent with the priorities of the arts world—changed with the ruling political 
philosophies.  An important change, discussed below, occurred with the 1979 election that 
made Margaret Thatcher Prime Minister.  Thatcher once said, ‘Economics is the method, but 
the object is to change the soul’ (quoted in Harvey 2005: 23).   
In the UK, state funding for the arts started in earnest with a wartime agency, the 
Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA), set up in 1940 to raise spirits 
on the home front.5 Initially, it supported somewhat middlebrow programs.  However, when 
John Maynard Keynes took the helm in 1941, the artistic content supported by CEMA moved 
sharply to the highbrow.  He was reportedly ‘not a man for wandering minstrels and amateur 
theatricals. He believed in excellence’ (Wu, 2002: 34). The fact that Lord Keynes, a 
representative of the ‘cultured’ elite, shifted the CEMA funds under his control from easily 
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accessible ‘art for the people’ to the fine arts ‘exclusively’ would not be a surprise to 
Bourdieu. 
After the war, in 1946, the British government established the Arts Council of Great 
Britain.  At that time, state funding of the arts was largely seen as beneficial to the fine arts. 
 
A widely shared assumption of the time was that ‘authentic,’ ‘high’ … culture needed 
to be protected, maintained and … disseminated against an ever more dominant and 
meretricious mass culture. (McGuigan, 2009: 153) 
 
From the very beginning, the Arts Council carried tensions between support for an ‘excellent’ 
quality of art and an effort to disseminate art to people from different regions or walks of life.  
This was often phrased as a debate between ‘raising’ (of standards, even if this meant a focus 
on London) or ‘spreading’ (distributing works across the country).  However, as DiMaggio 
(1982a, b) has argued, for art to be seen widely as status-enhancing ‘high culture’, it must be 
made available (though education), but only partially, to non-elite groups in society—that is, 
it must be spread at least somewhat.  Thus although they may stand in opposition, both aims, 
excellence in art and reaching broader audiences, fit the arts world’s own goals. 
The Arts Council was, importantly, set up with an ‘arms-length’ arrangement.  The 
Treasury allocated funds to the Council, and the Council, independently from Government, 
decided how to spend them. This arrangement was put in place to protect the arts from 
interference by political parties.  From the perspective of the arts world, this was beneficial 
because the Council was, to a very great extent, autonomous. The Arts Council responded to 
initiatives from the arts world rather than devising its own initiatives.  Along with the arms-
length principle, this was a strategy to avoid an ‘official’ art arising from the state.  All in all, 
in the early days of the Arts Council, the art world was successful in safeguarding its 
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autonomy even as it gained state funding.  And over time, arts institutions came to see the 
Arts Council as a largely benign source of largesse.   
In 1979 when she became Prime Minister, Thatcher, a bearer of neoliberal ideology, 
privatized many industries (i.e. sold publicly run services to private companies) and changed 
the relationship between the state and the state-supported organizations that were not 
privatized.  In the arts, Thatcher’s government added various requirements that accompanied 
any funding, such that arts organizations needed to show ‘value for money’ and needed to be 
auditable. 6  Arts organizations that were regularly funded by the Arts Council were required 
to follow ‘best practice’ in arts management: to prepare business plans and submit to 
management reviews. National museums also were required to prepare forward planning and 
strategy documents and to be audited for efficiency and effectiveness in meeting targets.   
Thatcher, crucially, cut funding to the arts, defunding some arts organizations 
entirely.  Reduced funding posed challenges to arts organizations where budgets could no 
longer support programs and staffing costs made possible by more generous government 
funding.  To maintain the accustomed levels of programing, arts organizations had to seek 
supplemental funding elsewhere, through sponsorship or through earned income generated 
through ‘better management’.  Thatcher also put in place incentives for corporations to fund 
arts organizations.  Corporations also required arts organizations to be accountable for the 
funds that were offered (Alexander, 1996a, b; cf. Trnka and Trundle, 2014). 
Subsequent governments have continued these policies, although varying them in 
some particulars.7 Conservative Prime Minister John Major, elected in 1990, maintained most 
of Thatcher’s policies toward the arts.  The New Labour party, which came into power in 
1997 with Prime Minister Tony Blair, seemed to promise dramatic shifts in policy across all 
sectors. However, the ‘new’ in New Labour meant a more centrist and business-friendly 
party, and while Blair increased funding to the arts sector, he nevertheless adopted neoliberal 
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policies towards the arts that had notable affinities to Thatcher’s.  Requirements for auditing, 
accountability, and efficient administration continued for arts organizations funded by the 
state.   
Moreover, Blair also asked the arts to contribute to non-arts policy objectives. Early 
in his tenure, his government required arts organizations to contribute to his ‘social inclusion’ 
and ‘neighbourhood renewal’ agendas.  In other words, arts organizations were asked to 
increase the diversity of their audiences and to influence and inspire not only individuals but 
neighbourhoods as well, particularly disadvantaged ones.  That the arts could contribute to 
these extrinsic policy areas underpinned the justification for continued state support of the 
arts. Later in Blair’s tenure, the arts were valued, in policy terms, by their ability to provide 
‘economic impact’, for instance, by attracting tourists and supporting the for-profit creative 
sector.   As McGuigan (2005: 238) notes: 
 
A distinctive yet seldom mentioned feature of neo-liberal development is to translate 
issues of social policy into questions of cultural policy.  And, in its turn, cultural 
policy ceases to be specifically about culture at all.  The predominant rationale for 
cultural policy today is economic, in terms of competitiveness and regeneration, and, 
to a lesser extent, social, as an implausible palliative to exclusion and poverty.8 
 
The Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown replaced Blair in 2007.  During his short term in 
office, he continued a largely instrumental and neoliberal approach to the arts.  
In 2010, the UK General Election failed to return a majority to any party.  As a result, 
a coalition government between David Cameron (Conservative) and Nick Clegg (Liberal 
Democrat) was formed. This government made dramatic changes in many policy areas, often 
going much further than Thatcher with respect to funding cuts and privatization.  In the arts 
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sphere, the Coalition acted to further a ‘philanthropy agenda’ (Cabinet Office, 2010),9 as part 
of the ‘Big Society’.  (The ‘Big Society’, part of the Conservative Party’s manifesto, 
promoted voluntarism as complementary to a shrinking state.)  The Coalition hoped to 
encourage private philanthropy in place of public funding.  As with Thatcher, these changes 
were accompanied by funding cuts for the Department for Media and Sport (DCMS) and the 
Arts Councils. And from 2015, austerity increased under Cameron’s Conservative (only) 
government.10 
To sum up: Arts organizations entered into exchanges with the state, and later, 
through the state’s influence, with corporations.  Previously, state funding for the arts worked 
to benefit elites in the arts world as well as those in the political realm.  Public funding 
provided rewards for the state, through the production of public cultural goods that provided 
a cultural legitimation for the nation-state and its governments.  And it provided the ability 
for arts institutions, functioning relatively autonomously from the market and from political 
influence, to produce art for both public good and private distinction.  Arts funding by the 
British government before 1979 protected arts institutions from both the marketplace and 
from the state itself through the arms-length principle that granted autonomy (from the state) 
to the government agencies that funded the arts.  Indeed, these agencies were part of the 
autonomous art world.  Since Thatcher, however, the system has shifted. The creation of an 
exhibition or performance, by itself, is no longer a sufficient return for state (or corporate) 
funds. A crucial part of recent state funding is that arts organizations must give evidence of 
being well managed, professional, and accountable (c.f. Power, 1997), through the adoption 
of particular management styles. Today’s funding pushes arts intuitions into the arms of the 
market as the state has asserted control over its funding agencies, and arts organizations must 
take on a neoliberal calculus where the arts are valued by their extrinsic outcomes and 
organizations are run with business-world logic and tools.11 
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The autonomous status of art has been challenged as arts institutions come to be 
influenced not only by the commercial field but also by the state. The effects of such a 
change in arts institutions are extensive.12  For instance, Wu (2000) showed how corporate 
sponsorship, which was explicitly encouraged by the state, led to the appearance of corporate 
logos in art galleries and the use of fine arts for advertising purposes.  Macdonald (2002) 
discussed how museums began to market themselves in the 1980s in a direct response to state 
pressures for measurable outcomes, such as increased visitor numbers.  At this time, the 
Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A) produced infamous advertising posters with the caption, 
‘An ace caff with quite a nice museum attached’.  For many curators in the museum, as well 
as observers outside of it, ‘this advertisement was a blatant admission of the debasement of 
scholarship and the proper functions of the museum, and their subsumption to mere 
commercial and leisure interests’ (Macdonald, 2002: 35).  However, the V&A was simply 
ahead of its time.  Today, advertising by arts institutions is completely unremarkable, as it 
has become utterly common.  
In addition to a focus on the marketable, arts institutions have moved from more 
elitist and scholarly aims to more populist and managerial ones, with more explicit agendas 
for inclusiveness and building audiences (Belfiore and Bennett, 2008) and more 
accountability through setting and meeting of targets and engaging in strategic and financial 
planning (Alexander, 2007). Changes are visible on the public-facing side of the institution—
for instance, a current exhibition at the V&A is the popular exhibition Undressed: A Brief 
History of Underwear.13  The V&A also runs the V&A Innovative Leadership Programme, 
which helps participants to ‘develop powerful tools for personal and professional growth’, 
which is clearly different from a traditional museum course on art appreciation or crafting.14 
Behind the scenes, the need for planning, marketing, and outreach changes the organizational 
structure of arts institutions and how artistic and professional careers work within them.  The 
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merits of these changes can be debated; however, the crucial point is that each of these 
activities represents an actual reduction in the autonomy of the sector as well as a weakening 
of the ideology of autonomy in the fine arts. 
 
Legitimacy, Neoliberalism, and the Supported Arts Sector 
The account given above suggests that changes are simply a matter of state power 
enacted through resource dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003): arts organizations had 
become dependent on state funding, and as their need to retain access to these monies was 
stronger than their objections to the state’s changed terms, arts organizations acquiesced to 
state demands.  Similarly, as state funding was curtailed, corporate funds became a crucial 
resource, giving corporations power over arts institutions.  Related to this is the idea of 
‘coercive isomorphism’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150), which ‘results from both formal 
and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are 
dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function.’  
These ‘simple’ mechanisms may have profound consequences, however.  In the US 
setting, DiMaggio (1991) argues that state and foundation funding exert coercive pressures 
that push towards a ‘logic of access’ (funders prefer larger audiences for various reasons) and 
a ‘logic of accountability’ (funders expect detailed financial reports).  Similar arguments are 
made by Alexander (1996a), who also shows that the proportion of special exhibitions in 
American art galleries that have more popular formats and accessible content increases when 
galleries receive public and corporate funding.  In the UK, the recent Conservative and 
Coalition governments have used the economic crisis as a justification for their main policy 
objective, which has been to enact neoliberal philosophy. Couching their ideological 
approach in economic terms makes it seem natural and inevitable (see Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 2001).  Arts organizations are not alone in being affected at a deep level, as their 
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very practices as organizations reflect, and legitimate, the dominant ideology.  It is worth 
considering how these resource dependencies in one field of action might work within the 
field of power, as part of a broader legitimation of neoliberal ideology in society.  
 
The Legitimacy of Neoliberalism 
In order to win government grants and to solicit corporate funds, arts institutions must 
speak the language of business (Hewison, 1995).  To raise funds, then, arts institutions must 
woo funders on the funders’ terms.  Importantly, using certain terms (incorporating business 
buzz words in government grant applications, on web pages, or in pitches to corporations) or 
metrics (counting audience numbers, tracking revenue, or producing balanced account sheets) 
does not seem, on first glance, to change the art that is delivered.  Funders do not seek to 
influence the ‘content’ of the arts.  The changes they request, therefore, appear superficial 
and peripheral to the core ‘business’ of arts organizations.  And yet, neoliberal interests 
penetrate these organizations through practices, perhaps even more deeply than they would if 
they focused on trying to influence content. 
Neoliberal interests penetrate, in the first instance and as Bourdieu suggested, through 
language.  For instance, it matters whether arts institutions speak of ‘visitors’ or ‘customers’.  
Bourdieu warns, ‘beware of words’ (quoted in Wacquant, 1989: 54) as they ‘import with 
them in an occult manner, a whole worldview constructed around historicized thinking; a 
kind of linguistic Trojan horse’ (Grenfell, 2012: 251).15  Moreover, adopting neoliberal 
language is related to the reduction of autonomy, despite the fact that no state agency (or 
corporation) dictates what to display or perform, or proclaims what good art is.  Looking for 
direct attacks on content misses the real issue in the hegemonic domination of arts 
organizations. The necessary changes, which may initially appear ‘shallow’, demonstrate a 
kind of acceptance of neoliberalism that showcases and legitimates this belief system. 
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Further, people in the arts world do not need to take the ideology to heart, they just 
need to implement it in the practices of arts organizations.  The state requires arts institutions 
to accept certain management tools and certain actions apparently at the surface level. The 
state does not compel individuals to believe in the neoliberal doctrine, just as it does not 
explicitly require particular kinds of artistic output. This apparently superficial change hides 
the very deep hegemonic domination of arts institutions.  Many in the arts world strongly 
oppose neoliberal values (see Appleyard, 1984; Bourdieu and Haake, 1995; Hooper-
Greenhill, 1988; Hewison, 1995; Osborne, 1986; West and Smith, 2005).  Nevertheless, the 
dominant system gains symbolic capital from each strategy document, mission statement, and 
five-year plan produced in arts organizations.  These provide evidence that the neoliberal 
model is correct, and that galleries, symphonies, opera, and dance and theatre companies 
should be managed like businesses, even if many of the artists, curators, musicians, 
composers, dancers, choreographers, actors, and playwrights might disagree. 
Johnson, Dowd and Ridgeway (2006) suggest that legitimacy is a social process, with 
four stages, including ‘innovation’, ‘local validation’, ‘diffusion’, and ‘general validation’.  
The UK supported arts sector was obviously not involved in the first two stages (innovation 
and local validation), which for neoliberalism have deep roots that can be traced back 
through the writings of Hayek (1994 [1944]) to the liberal philosophies of the nineteenth 
century.  The more recent growth of neoliberalism has been international and diffuse (Evans 
and Sewell, 2013).  The supported arts sector, however, is caught up in the diffusion process, 
which requires that the ‘social object’ (e.g. neoliberalism) be proliferated and translated into 
different parts of society. Thus, the diffusion of neoliberalism legitimates it. 
Neoliberalism is profoundly legitimated by becoming embedded in arts organizations 
(and in homologous ways in other fields).  The fact that arts institutions (just like charities, 
universities, or various public services) have adopted particular business practices suggests 
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that this way of organizing is, at the minimum, a very sensible way to organize, or taken 
further, that it is the natural, inevitable way of doing so, the only possible way to think about 
human endeavour.  With the widespread use of neoliberal rationality, other forms of 
rationality are weakened or closed down.   
 
 Changing Fields of Power 
The contemporary state and the dominant classes associated with it have changed, and 
this affects the way legitimating processes work in the supported arts sector.  Previously, 
elites supported prestigious art works and arts institutions (with the prestige reflecting back 
through the ‘halo effect’). Now, they legitimate the business-centred approaches they favour 
by changing the practices of arts institutions.  Believing, and wanting others to believe, that 
business rationality, a consumer orientation, and self-support through earned income and 
grant-getting are the best way to run non-profit organizations, these elites press arts 
organizations to adopt these practices. And in achieving this, elites naturalize the neoliberal 
model and discredit alternative ways of operating non-profits.  
Thatcherism was the British manifestation of a world-wide restructuring of capitalism 
which, among other things, empowered a financial elite over other elite orders, such as those 
rooted in aristocracy (Evans and Sewell, 2013).  Thus, a change in the field of power has 
affected arts institutions, which in the 1940s had enhanced the cultural and symbolic capital 
of intellectual elites like Lord Keynes.  From 1979 arts institutions also, if reluctantly, 
enhanced the legitimacy of financial elites and their political allies through their acceptance 
of neoliberal ideology.  In the past, artists have flattered their patrons with compliments, 
beneficial portrayals, or inclusion in the artwork.  Now the practices through which arts 
organizations operate flatter the ideology of the patrons.  
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‘The Scourge of Neoliberalism’ 
Bourdieu wrote passionately about the ‘scourge of neoliberalism’ (Bourdieu, 1998b: 
vii). His reflections on the topic are scattered across his writings, but he wrote explicitly 
about the effect of neoliberalism on culture (1998b; 2003). His focus in these comments was 
on publishing and cinema, rather than the fine arts. He also continued to emphasise the threat 
from commercial influence. In Acts of Resistance, Bourdieu wrote about an anxious 
insecurity in Britain and France made worse by a threat to the arts:  
 
Added to this, at the present time, is the destruction of the economic and social bases 
of the most precious cultural gains of humanity.  The autonomy of the worlds of 
cultural production with respect to the market, which had grown steadily through the 
battles and sacrifices of writers, artists and scientists, is increasingly threatened.  The 
reign of ‘commerce’ and the ‘commercial’ bears down more strongly every day on 
literature, particularly through the concentration of publishing, which is more and 
more subject to the constraints of immediate profit; on literary and artistic criticism, 
which has been handed over to the most opportunistic servants of the publishers…; 
and especially on the cinema… Not to mention the social sciences, which are 
condemned either to subordinate themselves to the directly self-interested sponsorship 
of corporate or state bureaucracies or wither under the censorship of power … or 
money. (1998b p. 37-8) 
 
He expanded on these comments in ‘Culture is in Danger’, a chapter in Firing Back.  He 
writes, ‘What is at stake here is the perpetuation of a cultural production that is not oriented 
toward exclusively commercial ends and is not subject to the verdicts of those who dominate 
mass media production’ (2003: 70). 
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Bourdieu (1998b: 25) writes, the ‘state nobility, which preaches the withering away of 
the state and the undivided reign of the market and the consumer, the commercial substitute 
for the citizen, has kidnapped the state: it has made the public good a private good.’  Here, 
Bourdieu’s words highlight an irony in the observation that the UK supported arts sector has 
become more heteronomous with the state.  This is not an argument about the influence of 
the ‘Big State’ of welfare capitalism, which the political right argues needs to be dismantled.  
That political system supported an autonomous field of cultural production. Instead, it is the 
right’s ‘small’, noninterventionist state that is doing the interpenetrating.16   
Of course, the fine arts in the supported arts sector have never been truly autonomous; 
they have been closer to Bourdieu’s (1993) idea of ‘Bourgeois’ art, given that they have 
attracted privileged and, more recently, middle-class patrons and audiences.  However, they 
were part of ‘legitimate culture’ (Bourdieu, 1984), as consumption of the fine arts 
represented a status claim for ‘the establishment’. Despite these complexities, a strong belief 
that art should be autonomous and should be protected from interference has obtained for the 
last 150 years or so.  The cultural and symbolic capital of elites who consumed it depended 
on this, and in later work, Bourdieu argued that the ideology of autonomy was a worthy 
achievement. A new dominant order has emerged, however.  Art and culture matter less, and 
profits and wealth matter more, as cultural capital appears to be displayed not in taste for the 
fine arts, but in taste for consumer goods and experiences such as dining out or travelling. 
 
Homologies across Fields 
Throughout his work, Bourdieu argued that different fields situated within the ‘field 
of power’ are homologous due to the structuring influence of the overarching field of power. 
As Jenkins (1992: 86) put it, the homologies among fields, or ‘the resemblance which is 
bound up with difference’, is ‘a consequence of the power of dominant fields, particularly the 
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field of power (politics), to impinge upon weaker fields and structure what occurs in them.’  
However, as Thomson (2012: 78) wrote: 
 
Bourdieu is unequivocal that some fields are dominant and others subordinate, but it 
is not necessarily clear how this domination is materially enacted… Bourdieu argued 
that the interrelationships of fields were specific and not amenable to a universal 
theory.   
 
I have suggested that state funding, via resource dependencies and coercive pressures, is one 
way in which neoliberalism was insinuated into arts organizations in the supported arts 
sector.  However, this may be only one of several mechanisms by which the 
interrelationships between the political and commercial fields and other fields occur, and 
homologies across fields may be created in a variety of ways. 
The field structures of many types of arts institutions, such as museums (Grenfell and 
Hardy, 2007), contain significant homologies across national contexts, and may be similarly 
homologous with respect to the penetration of neoliberal ideology. As with arts institutions in 
the UK, arts institutions in other countries appear to face pressures from neoliberal states and 
from the commercial sector. In continental Europe, funding for arts institutions was 
privatized (devolving from state-centred funding to a mixed arrangement of public and 
private funds) to conform more closely to what is called the ‘American model’ (Boorsma et 
al., 1998), and these institutions were required to contribute to non-arts policy outcomes 
(Gray, 2007). The precise nature of the interpenetration of fine arts institutions with the 
neoliberal state, however, may vary across national contexts. 
For instance, in America, arts controversies appear to be a major component in the 
relationship between American arts institutions and the state (Dubin, 1992; Kidd, 2012; 
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Rothfield; 2001; Shockley and McNeely, 2009).  And while corporate and government 
funding have changed exhibitions in American arts organizations (Alexander, 1996 a, b), US 
corporate funding arrived in the arts as part of a larger, deeply embedded philanthropic 
culture.  In contrast, in the UK (and elsewhere) corporate sponsorship was specifically 
encouraged by the state. 
Another useful comparison to the UK supported arts sector is higher education.  In the 
cultural arena more broadly, the neoliberal university has become familiar both in the UK 
(Collini, 2012; Gill, 2010; Monbiot, 2000: Ch. 9; Smith, 2010; 2012) and the US (Espeland 
and Sauder, 2007; Readings, 1996; Tuchman, 2009).  Detailed analysis may show the levels, 
effects, and mechanisms whereby the state or neoliberalism influences this sector in various 
national contexts. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has two interrelated aims. First, to consider that neoliberalism penetrates 
spheres where alternative philosophies had previously flourished.  And second, to use 
Bourdieu’s notion of fields and autonomy/heteronomy to understand the relationship among 
fields, expanding it to suggest heteronomy in cultural spheres can come not only from the 
commercial but from the political field.   
I have provided one explanation of how the state and its current philosophy, 
neoliberalism, gets into the field of cultural production.  This occurs through a Faustian 
bargain, in the medium of funding, with resulting resource dependencies and coercive 
pressures. Importantly, neoliberalism penetrates arts institutions apparently on the surface 
level, but the superficial changes needed to fit an art gallery or an opera company to the 
neoliberal state have profound consequences.  The apparent superficiality reduces resistance 
at the same time as it legitimates the neoliberal philosophy through the diffusion of its 
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practices.  And enacting neoliberal practices through funding and operations management, 
changes arts institutions, moving them away from a more autonomous realm focused on the 
intrinsic merits of the arts to a heteronomous realm where customers, marketing and financial 
planning are ‘naturally’ more important.  
The increasing ascendance of neoliberalism and its intrusion into spaces where 
markets had been weak or absent—the arts, universities, charities, the professions, social 
services, health care, among others, in the UK and internationally—suggests that 
neoliberalism represents something new, signalling a significant change in the relations 
among fields.  Indeed, its rise is possibly the most important and consequential ideological 
developments of our era.  Consequently, understanding how it gains legitimacy by making its 
core practices seem inevitable, especially in previously autonomous arenas, is a vital task for 
the 21st century. 
 
Notes:  
                                                
1 I would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Sara Arber, Jim Benson, Anne Bowler, Martin 
Bulmer, Geoff Cooper, Charlie Masqualier, Erkki Sevänen, and Vera Zolberg for support and 
comments on earlier drafts, as well as the anonymous reviewers for useful suggestions. 
2 To be clear, I refer to art galleries in the British sense of the term to indicate public or non-
profit museums that display art.  I do not discuss commercial art galleries (dealerships) in this 
paper.   
3 Each of these terms suggests a somewhat different subset of changes. More generally, terms 
such as ‘commercialization’, or ‘Disneyfication’ (Zukin, 1996) and ‘Disneyization’ (Bryman, 
2004), as well as ‘McDonaldization’ (Ritzer, 1993), describe aspects of similar trends (very 
loosely conceived) in various fields. It is not the project of this article to disentangle the 
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complexities of these terms, but rather to examine how funding imposes the set of processes 
they describe on arts organizations. 
4 It is not clear what terms differentiate a larger, more encompassing ‘field’ from a smaller, 
subsumed, one, or when the term ‘subfield’ is preferable. Bourdieu talked about fields within 
fields (e.g. 1993: 37-8), but also about ‘sectors’ (e.g. 1993: 39) or ‘poles’ (e.g. 1993: 40) 
within a field.  
5 For a discussion of the history of state funding of the arts in the UK, see, amongst others, 
Minihan (1977), Pearson (1982), Alexander (2007, 2008), Alexander and Rueschemeyer 
(2005), Gray (2000), Hewison (1995), Pick, (1991), Upchurch (2004), and Wu (2002). 
6 For overviews of Thatcher’s policies towards the arts, see Alexander and Rueschemeyer 
(2005), Beck (1989), Bennett (1995), Hewison (1995), Gray (2000), and Wu (2002). 
7 For discussions of cultural policies after Thatcher, see Alexander (2007; 2008; 2014), 
Belfiore (2002; 2004; 2009; 2012), Gray (2008), O’Brien (2014).  
8 On the lack of evidence that the arts foster social inclusion, see Belfiore and Bennett (2008). 
9 Philanthropy has also been captured by market ideology, in the new ‘philanthrocapitalism’ 
(Bishop and Green, 2008). 
10 This paper does not consider Theresa May’s government. 
11 Of course, these broad-brush explanations conceal complexity, such as divisions within 
museums (Rees Leahy, 2007; Zolberg, 1986) and debates within the field (Gibson, 2008; 
O'Neill, 2008).  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss how different factions or 
people within specific cultural organizations reacted to government policies, or how cultural 
policy is itself a partially unintended ‘resultant’ of complex actions of many parties (c.f. 
Allison and Zelikow, 1999).    
12 And in terms of effects on artists and art itself, McGuigan (2016) suggests that Damien 
Hirst is the contemporary neoliberal artist par excellence, who has been able to capitalize on 
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his brand to become a rich man (see also Thompson, 2008).  While not disagreeing with this 
assessment per se, the neoliberal penetration of arts institutions means that such institutions 
are more likely to showcase well-known artists with broad appeal, focusing on the popular, 
conventional and well-known, rather than the esoteric, little-known, forgotten or 
experimental.  In the visual arts, this includes Monet, Van Gogh, Rembrandt, Matisse and 
other great artists who are also household names.  In classical music, this would be Bach, 
Beethoven and Brahms—but also famous (or sometimes unnamed) composers of pop music 
or television theme songs, renditions of which are played by a symphony at the Proms. 
13 In October 2016, the V&A hosted four special exhibitions: Undressed, as mentioned, as 
well as You Say You Want a Revolution? Records and Rebels 1966–1970, Engineering the 
World: Ove Arup and the Philosophy of Total Design, and Opus Anglicanum: Masterpieces 
of English Medieval Embroidery.  The first two are quite clearly pitched to a popular 
audience.  The second two may focus on more scholarly topics, but to be sure, they are 
beautifully designed and packaged with accessible descriptions and supporting material.  The 
V&A is not alone in this, and examples of similar activities are readily available on the home 
pages of arts institutions across all disciplines. 
14 See https://www.vam.ac.uk/info/va-innovative-leadership-programme.  The programme 
description also states, ‘You will explore how to apply your passion and creativity to the 
practicalities of leading in an ever-changing and increasingly complex world and how to lead 
innovatively in the creative industries.’ 
15 For an excellent analysis of the language used by Tony Blair’s New Labour, see Fairclough 
(2000). 
16 Centeno and Cohen (2012: 325) noted, the ‘smaller’ state did not actually materialise; 
globally, states did not shrink very much.  Indeed, they write, ‘The centrality of politics 
belies the contention that neoliberalism was antistatist’ (p. 325). 
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